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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the burgeoning psychological literature on happiness 
and hedonic adaptation (a person‘s capacity to preserve or recapture her level of 
happiness by adjusting to changed circumstances), bringing this literature to bear on 
a previously overlooked aspect of the civil litigation process: the probability of pre-
trial settlement.  The glacial pace of civil litigation is commonly thought of as a 
regrettable source of costs to the relevant parties.  Even relatively straightforward 
personal injury lawsuits can last for as long as two years, delaying the arrival of 
necessary redress to the tort victim and forcing the litigants to expend ever greater 
quantities of resources.  Yet these procedural delays are likely to have salutary 
effects on the litigation system as well.  When an individual first suffers a serious 
injury, she will likely predict that the injury will greatly diminish her future 
happiness.  However, during the time that it takes her case to reach trial the 
aggrieved plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to her injury—even if that injury is 
permanent—and within two years will report levels of happiness very close to her 
pre-injury state.  Consequently, the amount of money that the plaintiff believes will 
fairly compensate her for her injury—will ―make her whole,‖ in the typical parlance 
of tort damages—will decrease appreciably.  The sum that the plaintiff is willing to 
accept in settlement will decline accordingly, and the chances of settlement 
increase—perhaps dramatically.  The high costs of prolonged civil litigation are thus 
likely to be offset substantially by the resources saved as adaptive litigants succeed 
in settling before trial. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Perhaps the most important recent development in social 
science research is the emergence of an interdisciplinary group of 
psychologists, economists, and public policy analysts devoted to the 
study of happiness, or, as it is known in the literature, hedonics.
1
  
Investigators have begun to ask questions about the kinds of things 
that make people happy, about people‘s ability to predict what will 
make them happy, and about the intensity and duration of changes in 
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1
 See WELL-BEING:  THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
  
 
 
 Hedonic Adaptation 2 
happiness.
2
  The answers to these questions have challenged some of 
the fundamental tenets of psychological and economic theory.
3
  They 
also have significant practical implications for medicine, public policy, 
business, and, of course, the law.  The legal implications of the new 
happiness research are only now being realized, and this Article is the 
first to apply these findings to the settlement of civil litigation.    
 Among the most important and robust findings of hedonic 
psychology is the discovery that many positive and negative life 
events—including significant changes such as winning the lottery, 
being denied tenure, and becoming disabled—have little long-term 
effect on well-being.
4
  Immediately after experiencing these and other 
events, people show substantial changes in reported happiness, but in 
the weeks, months, and years that follow, people undergo a process of 
―hedonic adaptation‖ that nullifies the effect of the change and returns 
them to a pre-event level of well-being.  This adaptation occurs, in 
part, because people tend to shift their attention away from the few 
new things brought about by the change and back towards the 
mundane features of daily life.
5
  While many changes are subject to 
adaptation within a couple of years, others, it seems, tend to be 
unadaptable—particularly those injuries that cause constant or 
worsening pain.
6
 
 Concomitantly, although people often experience hedonic 
adaptation to major life events, researchers have found that people fail 
to recognize and remember adaptation‘s effects.7  An overwhelming 
body of evidence now shows that when people are asked to predict 
how future changes are likely to affect their well-being, they make 
significant errors in their estimations of both the intensity of the 
change and its duration.  Thus, healthy people tend to predict that 
becoming disabled will have a more substantial impact on their well-
                                                          
2
 Id. at ix. 
3
 See Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, Introduction, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS, at xii (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, eds. 2003). 
4
 Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman writes, ―The fundamental surprise of well-
being research is the robust finding that life circumstances make only a small 
contribution to the variance of happiness . . . .‖  Daniel Kahneman, Experienced 
Utility and Objective Happiness, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS, 
supra note 3, at 199. 
5
 On the role of attention in adaptation, see infra notes 85-87. 
6
 On the differences between adaptable and unadaptable injuries, see infra notes 
78-82. 
7
  See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998). 
  
 
 
 Hedonic Adaptation 3 
being and that the impact will last longer than it actually does.  In 
effect, they ignore the strength and speed of hedonic adaptation.
8
 
 In this Article, we apply this research on hedonic adaptation to 
the settlement of civil lawsuits.  Specifically, we examine the likely 
effects of adaptation on a plaintiff seeking the recovery of pain and 
suffering or punitive damages in a personal injury suit.  Following the 
research on hedonic psychology, we suggest that such a plaintiff, when 
making her initial settlement demands shortly after her injury, will 
tend to overestimate both the severity and the duration of her injury.  
Her attention will be drawn towards the novel and painful features of 
the injury, and, like most people, she will fail to recognize the extent 
to which hedonic adaptation will enable her to cope with her new 
circumstances.  During the many months that she will have to wait 
before trial, she will begin to experience the effects of hedonic 
adaptation, lifting her perception of her own well-being, and, we 
suggest, making her more willing to settle for a lower and more 
accurate sum. 
The legal literature is replete with attempts to weigh the 
benefits of additional trial processes—error reduction, fairness to 
litigants, improved opportunities to participate—against the 
administrative costs of delay.
9
  Indeed, modern due process doctrine is 
largely organized along these lines.
10
  Yet while all of these analyses 
count trial delays as pure economic losses, we propose that, by 
allowing plaintiffs time to adapt to their injuries, such delays may 
result in a beneficial increase in settlements.  Accordingly, we suggest 
that current accountings of drawn-out trial processes have understated 
the benefits that extended procedure can provide.  
 Part I of this Article sets out the principal law and economics 
model of civil settlement as well as recent challenges to the model 
                                                          
8
 This research is further discussed at infra notes 88-91. 
9
 For a particularly incisive treatment of these questions, see Adam M. Samaha, 
Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2006). 
10
 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (―More 
precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of 
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.‖). 
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drawn from psychological research.  In Part II, we elaborate on the 
social scientific research on hedonic adaptation and affective 
forecasting, and we survey the few legal scholars who have devoted 
attention to these discoveries.  In Part III, we apply the findings of 
hedonic psychology to the settlement of personal injury lawsuits, and 
in Part IV, we offer a series of empirically testable predictions about 
such lawsuits and reflect on potential implications and objections.   
 
 
I.  THE FACTORS THAT DRIVE CASES TOWARD SETTLEMENT 
 
 For the past quarter-century, perhaps no topic relating to the 
American civil justice system has received more scholarly attention 
than the attempt to understand what distinguishes lawsuits that settle 
from those that go to trial.  Fewer than two percent of federal civil 
lawsuits go to trial,
11
 but any case that does so presents a puzzle for 
law and economics.  The value of a lawsuit can be monetized by 
multiplying the probability of winning by the amount to be won, and 
then that value can be paid in settlement, avoiding the large transaction 
costs of litigation.  Both parties stand to gain handsomely from such a 
deal, so why would they ever choose to forgo it in favor of a trial? 
 Early hypotheses, operating under the assumption that parties 
rationally pursue the goal of maximizing wealth or utility, pointed to 
bargaining strategies or informational asymmetries as the reasons for 
trial.  Behavioral law and economics then modified the assumption of 
rationality by considering factors that undermine rational choice.  
Ultimately, behavioral psychology has indicated that wealth 
maximization is not the only goal driving decisions about settlement.  
Because other goals—principally, a desire for an outcome perceived as 
fair—influence the decision whether to settle, that decision would be 
affected in turn by a plaintiff‘s changing perception over time of the 
sum that constitutes fair compensation. 
 This Part briefly sketches the time that elapses during the 
litigation process.  It then surveys the development of the literature on 
settlement, describing the analytical framework we aim to augment via 
insights from the new psychological literature on happiness. 
 
                                                          
11
 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459, 462 Table 
1 Civil Trials in U.S. District Courts at Ten-Year Intervals, 1962-2002 (2004). 
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A.  Time in the Litigation Process 
 
Since Charles Dickens wrote about Jarndyce and Jarndyce 
more than 150 years ago,
12
 it has been widely understood and 
bemoaned that litigating a civil case all the way through trial takes a 
long time.  Today, the median interval in federal court between filing 
and trial adjudication is about two years.
13
  Even that figure does not 
include the time that elapses before filing, after an injury has occurred, 
while the harmed party decides whether to hire a lawyer and pursue a 
legal remedy.  When that decision is made and a lawyer is found, the 
lawyer must investigate whether the issue merits litigation.  If so, then 
a complaint is filed in the appropriate court.
14
  The defendant is 
notified of the suit by service of process,
15
 and litigation commences. 
First comes the filing of motions, as the defendant‘s lawyer 
will submit an answer to the complaint and perhaps a motion to 
dismiss the lawsuit.
16
  The court considers the motion and eventually 
rules on it, and if the suit is not dismissed, then discovery begins.  
Each party‘s lawyers draft lists of questions (interrogatories) that are 
propounded to the opposing party, whose lawyers then draft answers 
in consultation with their client.
17
 
After the interrogatories, the parties request from each other all 
documents relevant to the case.
18
  Finding and producing these 
documents can be onerous and time-consuming, as can reviewing the 
documents to find whatever important information might be contained 
within them.
19
  Then there are depositions.
20
  Each party‘s lawyers 
                                                          
12
 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) 
(1853). 
13
 STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5. 
14
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
15
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
16
 FED. R. CIV. P. 7, 12. 
17
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
18
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
19
 Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture: Unsolicited Advice for Future and 
Current Lawyers, 56 S.C. L. REV. 229, 240-41 (2004) (―Many civil litigators spend 
most or all of their time drafting discovery requests, compiling and reviewing 
documents and data to respond to discovery requests, drafting discovery responses, 
filing motions for protective orders regarding discovery or motions to compel 
discovery, responding to these motions, and otherwise fighting over discovery 
issues.‖). 
20
 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
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schedule times in which to question witnesses, and then the 
questioning occurs. 
The parties might then file motions for summary judgment.
21
  
Because this is such an important part of the litigation,
22
 it can take 
considerable time on the part of both lawyers and the court.
23
  If the 
motions are denied, then the next phase is the trial itself.  A jury is 
empanelled (unless the parties have waived their right to jury trial),
24
 
opening statements are made, witnesses are examined and cross-
examined, and finally closing arguments occur before the jury 
deliberates. 
Of course, few cases continue through all of these phases.  A 
lawsuit can settle at any time from filing through adjudication, or it 
can be terminated by a grant of a motion to dismiss or motion for 
summary judgment.
25
  The point is simply that when a case does not 
settle early, the steps it must take to wend its way through the 
litigation process to judgment take considerable time. 
Along the way, there will typically be ongoing settlement 
negotiations between the lawyers with little or no involvement by the 
clients, who are not professional negotiators and whose involvement 
might therefore run contrary to their own interests.
26
  Even if these 
negotiations have not borne fruit by the time the pre-trial litigation is 
nearing completion, a party still has much to gain by settling before 
trial.  The expense of trial itself can be considerable or even, in some 
cases, vast.  Not only must the lawyer be paid for every hour spent 
                                                          
21
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
22
 EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (West Group 2d ed. 2000); John 
Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2007). 
23
 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering 
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 171 (1988) (―The judge deciding a summary judgment question 
must along with her law clerks read, research, reflect, hold a hearing, read and 
research some more, and often must draft, revise, and issue a lengthy written opinion 
as well. Although presiding over a jury trial takes time, it may not take any more of 
the judge‘s time than does consideration of the summary judgment motion.‖); 
Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment: Boon or Burden?, 37 NO. 3 JUDGES‘ J. 26, 29 
(1998). 
24
 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
25
 E.g., Bronsteen, supra note 22, at 530. 
26
 See generally Windle Turley, Creating the Right Settlement Environment, 
TRIAL, June, 1994, at 28. 
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preparing for and performing in court,
27
 but also expert witnesses may 
have to be paid,
28
 and the court itself must expend its limited resources 
on only this case.
29
  Much is to be saved, therefore, by avoiding trial 
even if the parties have failed to avoid the costs of pretrial litigation. 
 
B.  The Rational Actor Model of Settlement Decisionmaking 
 
 As noted above, a case can settle at any time during the 
litigation process.  A settlement is possible, of course, only if the 
largest amount of money that a defendant is willing to pay exceeds the 
smallest amount of money that a plaintiff is willing to accept.
30
  Early 
proponents of law and economics created models that explained when 
that circumstance would arise, operating under the assumption that 
litigants will act to maximize their wealth.
31
 
 In the early 1970s, William Landes and Richard Posner began 
to analyze settlement through the lens of law and economics.
32
  
Building on their work, George Priest and Benjamin Klein later 
proposed a model of settlement—predicting that when cases fail to 
settle, they will be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff 50% of the 
time—that has permeated the literature ever since.33  Landes and 
Posner developed the core insight that the cost of litigating a case 
opens up a zone of bargaining within which the result for each party 
                                                          
27
 D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 903 (2006). 
28
 Bronsteen, supra note 22, at 534-35. 
29
 Id. at 540-41; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 421 
(1982) (―If cases are disposed of quickly, the time saved can be used to consider 
more cases.‖).  One commentator has estimated that trials cost federal courts about 
$4000 per day (not counting the cost to litigants), and although he was discussing 
criminal cases, the costs (such as judicial salary) apply equally to civil cases.  David 
Wippman, Notes and Comment, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT‘L 
L. 861, 868 (2006). 
30
 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation 
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 111 (1994) 
(―Lawsuits will settle if the defendant‘s maximum offer is higher than the lowest 
offer the plaintiff will accept.‖). 
31
 See id. at 108-09. 
32
 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); see also John P. Gould, The 
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973). 
33
 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
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will be better than the party‘s expected utility from litigating to trial.  
Specifically, a litigant will calculate the value (or cost, for a 
defendant) of a lawsuit by multiplying the damages by the probability 
of winning, then subtracting the cost of litigation.
34
  If the litigants 
each come to a similar assessment of the value of the case, then they 
will settle because doing so saves them the transaction costs of 
litigation. 
 For example, suppose that a plaintiff sues for $100,000 in 
damages and has a 50% chance of winning at trial.  Absent transaction 
costs, a risk-neutral plaintiff would accept a settlement offer of no less 
than the expected value of the lawsuit: $50,000 (i.e., $100,000 x .5).  
And a risk-neutral defendant would be willing to make a settlement 
offer of no more than that same expected value: $50,000.  The 
bargaining zone would be limited to that specific amount, and a case 
might well go to trial because settlement would be no better for either 
party than trial. 
 The introduction of transaction costs makes all the difference.  
Assume that litigating the case to adjudication would cost the plaintiff 
and defendant each $10,000.  That would make the expected value of 
the litigation $40,000 for the plaintiff and the expected cost $60,000 
for the defendant.  Any settlement between $40,000 and $60,000 
would be better for both parties than a trial.  The bargaining zone 
would thus be $40,000 to $60,000, and we would expect a settlement 
somewhere within that zone.
35
  Widening the bargaining zone in this 
way increases the likelihood of settlement.
36
  The classic economic 
model tells us nothing about the dollar value within that zone for 
which the case would settle, but merely that it would be some point in 
the range.
37
  By eliminating the transaction costs of trial, a settlement 
                                                          
34
 Richard A. Posner, supra note 32, at 418. 
35
 For a similar explanation and example, see Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and 
Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
36
 See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 101 (1990) (―[I]t is natural—as well as 
customary in the legal and economic literature—to assume that the likelihood of 
settlement is positively related to the width of the settlement zone.‖); Rave, supra 
note 27, at 892 (―Generally, the wider the settlement zone, the more likely the case is 
to settle.‖).  The existence and size of the bargaining (or ―settlement‖) zone is, on 
this account, the primary condition on which settlement depends.  See Korobkin, 
supra note 35, at 6. 
37
 Korobkin, supra note 35, at 8-9. 
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surplus is created—$20,000 in this example—that will benefit both 
parties even if it is divided in a way that does not benefit them equally. 
 It should be noted that even if the parties were wealth-
maximizing rational actors who reached the same assessment of the 
probability of a plaintiff victory, settlement would not be assured.  A 
trial could result from rational but ultimately harmful bargaining 
behavior.
38
  Each side might try to capture most of the settlement 
surplus for itself by hard bargaining—telling the opposing party that 
the only alternative to such a one-sided deal is a trial (which is an even 
less appealing option because it eliminates the entire surplus).  Both 
parties might play this game of ―chicken‖ all the way to the mutually 
unfavorable outcome of an adjudication.
39
  But this risk might be 
outweighed under certain circumstances by the potential benefit of 
capturing most of the settlement surplus, making such bargaining 
rational.  
 What emerges from the rational actor model is that two sorts of 
things—hard bargaining and differing assessments of a trial‘s likely 
outcome—can funnel cases away from settlement and toward 
adjudication.  These factors might, however, be mitigated to some 
degree by the fact that attorneys are sophisticated repeat-players.
40
 
 
C.  Behavioral Modifications of the Rational Actor Model 
 
 The classic economic model is based on the assumption that 
litigants act rationally to try to maximize their wealth.  Still working 
within the framework of wealth maximization as the litigants‘ only 
goal, several scholars have added nuances or modifications to these 
models by emphasizing the limits of human rationality.  And more 
recently, evidence has emerged that litigants pursue goals other than 
                                                          
38
 Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model 
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); see also Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950, 972-73, 975-76 (1979). 
39
 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 975. 
40
 Cf. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and 
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 81 (1997) 
(―How does the economic model accurately predict the high rate of settlement if 
disputant behavior systematically departs from the assumptions of the model in ways 
that suggest lower rates of settlement?  One likely answer, we submit, is the role of 
lawyers in the litigation system.‖). 
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wealth maximization—in particular, that they are far more likely to 
accept a settlement offer if they perceive it as fair. 
 
1. Obstacles to Wealth Maximization 
 
 Even when people aim to maximize wealth, they may fail due 
to psychological factors that lead them to act irrationally.  One such 
factor, optimism bias,
41
 causes both plaintiffs and defendants to 
overestimate their prospects of winning at trial.
42
  This reduces the 
likelihood of settlement.  If the damages sought are $100,000 and if 
the plaintiff and defendant each view their own odds of victory as 
65%, then the plaintiff will value the case at $65,000 and the 
defendant at $35,000.  If settlement would enable each to avoid 
$10,000 in costs, that would make the plaintiff willing to accept a 
minimum of $55,000 and the defendant willing to offer a maximum of 
$45,000.  Under these circumstances, no settlement will be reached. 
 Whereas optimism bias can shrink or even eliminate the 
bargaining zone, another set of behavioral considerations known as 
prospect theory can shift the zone toward plaintiffs or defendants.  
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have famously demonstrated 
that when people face the prospect of a gain, they are risk averse; 
                                                          
41
 As might be expected, this psychological trait affects many areas of life 
beyond the realm of litigation.  Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of 
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (―An amazingly 
robust finding about human actors . . . is that people are often unrealistically 
optimistic about the probability that bad things will happen to them.  A vast number 
of studies support this conclusion.  Almost everyone thinks that his or her chances of 
having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease, or getting fired from a job 
are significantly lower than the average person‘s chances of suffering these 
misfortunes; estimates range from twenty to eighty percent below the average 
person‘s probability.‖). 
42
 E.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-serving Assessments of Fairness and 
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 153 (1992).  Loewenstein and his co-
authors gave undergraduates a set of facts in an auto accident case, then paired them 
off as plaintiffs and defendants and instructed each pair to negotiate a settlement.  
Before negotiating, they were asked to guess the judge‘s award in the actual case and 
to decide the award they themselves deemed fair.  After negotiating, they were asked 
to recall the relevant facts of the case.  Although all subjects read the same facts, 
plaintiffs made substantially higher guesses and fairness determinations than did 
defendants, and each side recalled better the facts supporting its own claims than 
those that cut in favor of the opposing party.  Id. at 145-51. 
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whereas when they face the prospect of a loss, they are risk seeking.
43
  
A settlement is a fixed gain for a plaintiff or loss for a defendant, 
whereas a trial holds out the prospect of a larger but uncertain gain or 
loss.
44
  Applying prospect theory to the topic of settlement, Jeffrey 
Rachlinski has used experiments to illustrate that plaintiffs can be 
expected generally to be irrationally risk averse whereas defendants 
can be expected generally to be irrationally risk seeking.
45
  This 
phenomenon does not reduce settlement rates but does shift the 
bargaining zone downward, by making plaintiffs willing to settle for 
less and defendants unwilling to settle for amounts that risk-neutral 
litigants would find acceptable. 
 These effects reverse when probabilities are low.
46
  Imagine a 
nuisance lawsuit wherein the plaintiff has a very low chance of victory 
(say, 1%) but a very high amount of damages were he to win (say, $10 
million).  The bargaining zone would shift upward because people are 
risk-seeking with respect to gains and risk-averse with respect to 
losses when probabilities are low (explaining, for example, why they 
                                                          
43
 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 (1984); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
44
 One might speculate that, at least under certain circumstances, plaintiffs 
would not view the money at stake as a gain and defendants would not view it as a 
loss.  If, for example, a defendant had taken money from the plaintiff via the 
underlying tort or contract violation, then anything less than a full repayment of that 
baseline sum could be treated by the defendant as an overall gain and by the plaintiff 
as an overall loss.  This possibility is mentioned briefly in Part I.C.2, infra.  
However, Rachlinski‘s experimental findings suggest otherwise, indicating that 
plaintiffs view settlements as gains whereas defendants view them as losses. 
45
 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996).  In one experiment, undergraduates were assigned the role 
of attorney for either a plaintiff or defendant in a property lawsuit.  They were told 
the amount the plaintiff stood to gain at trial and the percentage chance of such a 
plaintiff victory.  Then they were told that the opposing side had offered to settle for 
an amount that corresponded to the probability times the amount; e.g., if a trial 
victory would yield $100,000 and the plaintiff had a 70% chance to win, then the 
offer was $70,000.  Far more plaintiff-attorney subjects than defendant-attorney 
subjects accepted the offer rather than take the all-or-nothing risk of a trial.  Id. at 
135-40. 
46
 Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000). 
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buy lottery tickets).
47
  The lowest payment acceptable to the plaintiff 
would be a higher number than it would have been if he were risk 
neutral, whereas the defendant would be willing to pay a 
correspondingly higher sum. 
 
2.  Fairness and Goals Other than Wealth Maximization 
 
 The above analyses of settlement all retain at least one basic 
assumption of the classic economic model: that a litigant‘s goal is to 
maximize her wealth.
48
  She might fail due to imperfect information, 
hard bargaining, or cognitive biases, but her objective is not in 
question.  Important literature in behavioral psychology has suggested, 
however, the need to change that assumption.  There is evidence that 
litigants are not pure wealth maximizers but rather people who also 
consider other values like fairness when deciding whether to accept a 
settlement offer.
49
  This evidence corroborates the emphasis that 
scholars have long placed on fairness or justice in civil procedure.
50
 
                                                          
47
 Id. at 167 (―When choosing between low-probability gains and losses with 
equal expected values, Kahneman and Tversky have found that individuals make 
risk-seeking choices when selecting between gains and risk-averse choices when 
selecting between losses.‖). 
48
 More precisely, his goal is to maximize utility, which is defined as wealth 
with a built-in accommodation for rational risk-aversion in keeping with the 
declining marginal value of money. 
49
 Fairness is not the only non-monetary consideration that can matter to 
litigants.  Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 
40, at 79-80 (―The list of reasons litigants might not behave in accordance with the 
[classic economic] model‘s predictions is impressively long: Litigants litigate not 
just for money, but to attain vindication; to establish precedent; ‗to express their 
feelings‘; to obtain a hearing; and to satisfy a sense of entitlement regarding use of 
the courts . . . .‖). 
50
 E.g., Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 139 (―[S]ubject disputants seemed more 
concerned with achieving what they considered to be a fair settlement of the case 
than maximizing their own expected value.‖); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, 
The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1448-49 (2003) 
(distinguishing between actual justice and adequate settlements in the class action 
context); Owen Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (arguing that 
justice is different from efficiency and should be prioritized over it in the civil justice 
system); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 444-45 (1982) 
(expressing the concern that docket pressures may be causing judges wrongly to 
value efficiency over justice). 
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 The stage was set for such evidence by the results of a game 
known as ultimatum bargaining.
51
  In a classic version of such a game, 
two people are given a sum of money (say $20) and told that one of 
them (the Proposer) will choose how to divide it between them.  If the 
other (the Accepter) accepts the proposed division, then that division 
will be final, but if he rejects it, then neither of the two participants 
will receive anything.  A rational Proposer would allot $19 (or $19.99, 
if the division were not limited to whole numbers) to himself and $1 to 
the Accepter, and a rational Accepter would accept the division in 
order to receive $1 rather than nothing.  But people routinely turn 
down such divisions, contrary to economic self-interest.  In fact, offers 
under 20% of the total are regularly rejected.
52
  Such behavior 
suggests that people care about other values—in particular, their 
perceptions of fairness. 
 Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie have conducted 
experiments regarding settlement that appear to support this view.
53
  In 
one such experiment, subjects were asked to decide whether to accept 
a settlement offer in a hypothetical personal injury case.  All subjects 
were told that they had been hurt in a car accident through no fault of 
their own and that they were suing an insurance company.  If they won 
at trial, they would receive $28,000 whereas if they lost, they would 
receive $10,000 (the amount undisputed by the insurer).  Their lawyer 
tells them that the result of a trial could go either way, and the 
defendant offers to settle for $21,000.
54
 
 There were two groups of subjects.  Those in Group A were 
told that they had owned a car worth $14,000 that was destroyed in the 
accident, and those in Group B were told the same thing except that 
their car had been worth $28,000.  Members of Group B were far less 
likely to accept the settlement offer than were members of Group A.
55
 
                                                          
51
 Werner Güth and Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey 
and Comparison of Experimental Results, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990); see 
also Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 142-43. 
52
  Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 
SCIENCE 1773 (2000); Karen M. Page & Martin A. Nowak, Empathy Leads to 
Fairness, 64 BULL. OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY 1101 (2002).  Nowak and 
colleagues write, ―The irrational human emphasis on fair division suggests that 
players have preferences which do not depend solely on their own payoff…‖  Nowak 
et al., supra note 52, at 1773. 
53
 Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An 
Experimental Approach, supra note 30. 
54
 Id. at 130-33. 
55
 Id. 
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 This experiment is particularly revealing.  The odds of winning 
at trial, the damages sought, and the settlement offer were held 
constant for both groups.  According to the assumptions of the Priest-
Klein model, both groups should have viewed the offer similarly.  
Because the defendant‘s bargaining behavior was the same in regard to 
both groups, the bargaining literature of Cooter and others would 
conclude that they should have acted similarly.  And because both 
groups were faced with prospective gains of the same size, the 
behavioral insights of Kahneman and Tversky (applied to settlement 
by Rachlinski and Guthrie) do not create a reason for the groups‘ 
results to diverge. 
 But they do diverge.  One way to characterize the divergence is 
as a simple offshoot of the core idea of prospect theory: Group A 
views the offer as a gain, and Group B views the offer as a loss.
56
  
Another characterization would be that the subject plaintiffs cared 
about values other than maximizing wealth—in particular, that they 
cared about achieving a result they viewed as fair compensation for 
their loss.  Either way, we are left with the conclusion that plaintiffs 
compare settlement offers to the amount they have been harmed and 
are far more likely to accept offers exceeding that amount. 
 Such a conclusion has important implications in light of 
hedonic adaptation to injury or adversity, as we will see.  Due to such 
adaptation, a plaintiff‘s assessment of how severely she has been 
harmed will often change over time.  This change, in turn, can be 
expected to affect the range of offers that she will be willing to accept 
in order to settle. 
 
D.  Putting It All Together 
 
 Among the many points that appear in the literature surveyed 
in this Part, one simple idea stands out in importance.  All 
commentators agree that the less money a plaintiff is willing to accept 
in order to settle, the more likely settlement will be.  Contrary to some 
early assumptions, there is now convincing evidence that plaintiffs 
may choose their lowest acceptable sum by identifying the amount 
they feel would fairly compensate them for the harm they have 
suffered. 
 If a plaintiff‘s perception of what would constitute fair 
compensation were to decrease as time passed, then that passage of 
                                                          
56
 See id. at 109. 
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time would accordingly increase the likelihood of settlement.  The 
delays associated with litigation could thus have the effect of saving 
parties and courts the costs of trial. 
 
 
II.  ADAPTATION TO DISABILITY AND THE FAILURE OF AFFECTIVE 
FORECASTING 
 
 When estimating the level of fair compensation for their 
injuries, plaintiffs must make predictions about the impact those 
injuries will have on their future lives.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is 
a dearth of legal scholarship addressing how plaintiffs make such 
predictions and how accurate their predictions are.  Recent social 
science research on well-being and prediction now provides clues to 
understanding plaintiffs‘ settlement behavior.  
 Consider this situation.  On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you 
rate your current happiness?  Now suppose that on the way home from 
work you are struck by a drunk driver and paralyzed from the waist 
down.  What do you predict would happen to your happiness 
immediately following the accident?  How about a year or two years 
later?  If you are like most people, you would expect that after the 
accident your happiness would plummet and that it would remain low 
for a long time.  You would probably predict that you would never be 
as happy as you were during that pleasant afternoon spent in your 
office reading an article on the hedonic psychology of legal settlement.  
According to a considerable body of recent psychological research, 
however, you would likely be wrong.  Although your subjectively 
reported happiness level would decline immediately following the 
accident, social scientists studying people affected by a host of 
disabilities—quadriplegia, kidney failure, lost limbs—have found that 
the disabled return to pre-disability states of happiness surprisingly 
quickly, often within two years.
57
  Moreover, psychologists have 
shown that your failure to anticipate the extent and rapidity of your 
recovery isn‘t unusual.  Healthy people consistently overestimate how 
unhappy a disability would make them, in part because they don‘t 
appreciate how quickly they will adapt to their new lives.
58
 
                                                          
57
 For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see 
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
58
 See Gilbert et al., supra note 7. 
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 This Part explores recent social scientific research on 
adaptation to disability
59
 and the inability to predict future states of 
happiness, known in the literature as the failure of affective 
forecasting.  We describe the evidence for adaptation as well as 
adaptation‘s limits, and we consider how and why people are unable to 
anticipate how disabilities will influence their well-being.  Although 
much of this research is quite new, its implications for the law have 
already attracted the notice of psychologists, economists, and legal 
scholars.  In the final section of this Part, we discuss their proposals. 
 
 A.  Hedonic Adaptation 
 
 In 1999, Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz 
―announce[d] the existence of a new field of psychology‖—hedonic 
psychology—that would study ―what makes experiences and life 
pleasant and unpleasant.‖60  Although some psychologists had been 
doing research on hedonics for decades, the new hedonic psychology 
promised to bring together an interdisciplinary group of social 
scientists  to ―analyze the full range of evaluative experience, from 
sensory pleasure to creative ecstasy, from fleeting anxiety to long-term 
depression, from misery to joy.‖61  Using analytic tools that range 
from traditional self-evaluation surveys to beeper-activated mood 
assessments and longitudinal surveys of national populations, hedonic 
psychology is quantifying individual and collective happiness, and it is 
measuring the impact that positive and negative life events have on 
subjective assessments of well-being.  Very often, the results are 
surprising.  Increased income, for example, does not make people 
much happier, but spending more time with family and friends does.
62
  
                                                          
59
 Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to ―disability,‖ we are not using the 
term to refer to any specific legally or medically defined injury but rather as a catch-
all category covering a wide range of injuries, illnesses, and debilities that 
potentially affect one‘s health and happiness. 
60
 Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface to WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).  
61
 Id. 
62
 See, e.g., RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 
(2005).    The economist Richard Easterlin compares how quickly people adapt to 
increases in income due to concomitant changes in aspirations and how slowly they 
adapt to nonpecuniary benefits like family life.  He writes: 
In particular, people make decisions assuming that more 
income, comfort, and positional goods will make them happier, failing 
to recognize that hedonic adaptation and social comparison will come 
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Most interestingly for this Article, psychologists have found that most 
life events, including apparently devastating ones such as those that 
cause disability, actually have little prolonged effect on well-being.  
People, it turns out, adapt amazingly quickly to change. 
 The effects of this hedonic adaptation, understood as any 
action, process, or mechanism that reduces the affective (emotional) 
consequences of an otherwise stable circumstance, were first detected 
in a canonical study on lottery winners and quadri/paraplegics.  Asked 
to rate their general happiness and current experience of mundane 
pleasures, lottery winners were not significantly happier than controls, 
and accident victims were not as unhappy as had been expected and 
above the mid-point of the scale.
63
  These data suggested that people 
experience life as if on a ―hedonic treadmill‖ such that good and bad 
events cause brief changes in well-being with rapid returns to an 
established set point.
64
  Although specific aspects of the treadmill 
theory have been challenged,
65
 a wealth of recent research has 
confirmed this general finding for other disabilities.  For example, 
studies have found that children and adolescents with limb 
deficiencies exhibit remarkably good psychosocial adjustment.
66
  
People with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being similar to 
those of healthy controls,
67
 as do burn victims,
68
 patients with 
                                                                                                                                         
into play, raise their aspirations to about the same extent as their actual 
gains, and leave them feeling no happier than before.  As a result, most 
individuals spend a disproportionate amount of their lives working in 
order to make money, and sacrifice family life and health, domains in 
which aspirations remain fairly constant as actually circumstances 
change, and where the attainment of one‘s goals has a more lasting 
impact on happiness.  Hence, a reallocation of time in favor of family 
life and health would, on average, increase individual happiness. 
Richard Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT‘L ACAD. OF 
SCI. 11,176, 11,178 (2003). 
63
 Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness 
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920-21 (1978). 
64
 Id.   
65
 See Diener et al., Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation 
Theory of Well-Being, 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 305 (2006) (hereinafter BHT); Richard E. 
Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being: Does 
Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 75 (2007). 
66
 Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb 
Deficiencies: A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 275 (1992). 
67
 C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional 
Status, 16 SPINE 78 (1991). 
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colostomies
69
 and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney 
disorders.
70
  As the authors of this last study note, ―Although 
[hemodialysis patients] report their health as being much worse than 
that of healthy controls, they do no appear to be much, if at all, less 
happy than people who do not have kidney disease or any other 
serious health condition.‖71 
 The aforementioned studies all applied a cross-sectional 
methodology that compares the reported well-being of disabled people 
with that of people who were not disabled.  In a compelling new study 
by economists Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, the 
authors track changes in subjective well-being longitudinally by 
comparing happiness ratings of individuals before their disability with 
assessments reported yearly following the disability.
72
  Since 1996, the 
British Household Panel Survey has reported information on 
respondents‘ psychological well-being and whether and to what extent 
they suffer from a disability.
73
  In these surveys, respondents rated 
their own level of happiness on a scale of 1 to 7, with larger numbers 
indicating greater life satisfaction.  Oswald and Powdthavee analyzed 
the responses from people who originally reported no disability but 
who subsequently became disabled during the course of the survey.  
They divided these people into those who were moderately disabled 
(―disabled but able to do day-to-day activities including housework, 
climbing stairs, dressing oneself, and walking for at least 10 minutes‖) 
and those who were seriously disabled (―unable to do at least one of 
the above day-to-day activities‖).74 
Oswald and Powdthavee‘s study produced noteworthy results.  
As a group, people who become disabled report an average well-being 
score of 4.8 for the two years preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7 
                                                                                                                                         
68
 David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 362 (1993). 
69
 Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. 
DECISION MAKING 58 (1990). 
70
 Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study 
Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (2005). 
71
 Id. at 7. 
72
 Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability With Implications for Economists and Judges, J. 
PUB. ECON. (forthcoming 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921040. 
73
 The survey contain over 10,000 adults who were interviewed between 
September and December each year since 1991.  Id. at 7. 
74
 Id. at 8.  There were 675 person-year observations in the Moderately Disabled 
category and 3,442 observations in the Severely Disabled category.  Id. 
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at the onset of disability, and then a subsequent rebound to 4.1 in the 
two years that follow despite the fact that the disabilities themselves 
have not changed.
75
  Separating the two groups, the authors find 
approximately 50% adaptation to moderate disability and 30% 
adaptation to severe disability.
76
  Thus, there is substantial evidence 
that hedonic adaption to disability is significant (if incomplete). 
 Due to its considerable size and longitudinal nature, Oswald 
and Powdthavee‘s recent study provides some of the strongest 
evidence for adaptation to disability.
77
  It must be noted, however, that 
the study also suggests that certain negative events appear to be more 
difficult to adapt to.  Low-level, chronic stimuli like noise, dull pain, 
and headaches have substantial long-term effects on happiness, as do 
diseases associated with progressive deterioration.
78
  One study, for 
example, found that instead of adapting to noise problems, college 
students actually became sensitized to it, experiencing higher levels of 
annoyance as time went on.
79
  Others have shown that people are less 
likely to adapt to unemployment
80
 and negative changes in marital 
status such as divorce and separation.
81
  Most significantly for our 
purposes, chronic or progressive disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis 
and multiple schlerosis appear to be resistant to adaptation in part due 
to the cumulatively deteriorating stimuli associated with such 
                                                          
75
 Id. at 9. 
76
 Id. at 13–14.  That is to say, over the course of two years moderately disabled 
people recover approximately 50% of their ―lost‖ happiness, and even severely 
disabled people regain more than 30% of the happiness they enjoyed before 
becoming injured. 
77
 But see Richard E. Lucas, Long-term Disability is associated with lasting 
changes in Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Two Nationally Representative 
Longitudinal Studies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 717, 718 (2007) (finding 
no evidence of adaptation from the same data set).  Oswald and Powdthavee note 
methodological differences between their paper and Lucas‘s, but, they write, ―we 
cannot be certain why we find much more adaptation than does Lucas.‖  Oswald & 
Powdthavee, supra note 72, at fn. 8. 
78
 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 311-12.   
79
 Neil. D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against 
Adaptation, 2 J. ENVIR. PSYCHOL. 87 (1992). 
80
 Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life 
Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 (2004). 
81
 Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of 
Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 527 (2003). 
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diseases.
82
  It is also worth pointing out that even where hedonic 
adaptation occurs, it is neither inevitable nor invariable.  Although 
adaptation effects may be seen cumulatively, individuals experience a 
range of responses to adaptable disabilities.
83
 
Understanding which disabilities are adaptable and which are 
not should lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms of 
adaptation.  We use the plural because it seems likely that hedonic 
adaptation is not a single process but rather an assortment of 
psychological processes.  Adaptation may result from physiological 
changes (such as increased upper body strength in paraplegics 
enabling more effective wheelchair mobility) or from conscious and 
unconscious cognitive changes in disabled people‘s interests, values, 
and goals.
84
 
Most recently, psychologists and economists have focused on 
the role attention plays in moderating the effects of negative events.  
Drawing an analogy between the psychological response to negative 
events and the body‘s response to disease, Daniel Gilbert and 
colleagues have suggested that people possess a ―psychological 
immune system‖ that dampens the hedonic effect of disability.85  
Defense mechanisms such as rationalization, dissonance reduction, 
and positive illusions diminish the intensity of the emotional response 
to disability by directing attention away from the disability and toward 
new skills and new sources of pleasure.  Similarly, Kahneman and 
Thaler note that attention is normally directed towards novelty, 
including changes in response to disability.  Therefore, ―as the new 
state loses its novelty it ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention, 
and other aspects of life again evoke their varying hedonic 
                                                          
82
 See C.A. Smith & K.A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic 
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 151 
(1992); R.F. Antonak & H. Livneh, Psychosocial Adaption to Disability and Its 
Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Schlerosis, 40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1099 
(1995).  Frederick and Loewenstein note, however, that the degree of adaptation may 
be particularly difficult to measure with these progressive diseases.  They write, 
―Even maintaining a constant hedonic state in the face of these deteriorating 
conditions would be impressive evidence of hedonic adaptation.‖  Frederick & 
Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 312. 
83
 See Diener et al., BHT, supra note 65, at 310-311.  The authors note, ―[W]e 
have found individual differences in the rate and extent of adaptation that occurs 
even to the same event.  In our longitudinal studies, the size and even the direction of 
the change in life satisfaction varied considerably across individuals.‖  Id. at 310. 
84
 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 57, at 302-03. 
85
 Gilbert et al., supra note 7. 
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responses.‖86  These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive, 
allowing people to recover quickly from considerable misfortune.
87
 
 
 B.  The Failure of Affective Forecasting—Focalism and 
     Immune Neglect 
 
 Although people are capable of hedonically adapting to a 
variety of positive and negative life events, recent social scientific 
research suggests that they consistently fail to anticipate such 
adaptation.  Over the past decade, psychologists and economists have 
begun to study affective forecasting—people‘s ability to judge how 
future experiences will make them feel.
88
  Most people, it turns out, do 
a surprisingly poor job of predicting the intensity and the duration of 
future feelings.
89
  This inability is particularly important in situations 
concerning disability and adaptation.   
 When asked to predict how they will feel upon the occurrence 
of some future hedonic event—eating a bowl of ice cream every day 
for a week, having their favorite candidate win an election, being 
denied tenure, or suffering an injury—people are able to estimate 
whether that event will make them feel good or bad (valence) and 
which emotions they will feel.  They are not very good, however, at 
predicting how strongly they will feel (intensity) or how long the 
feeling will last (duration).
90
   For both positive and negative events, 
people predict that they will feel more strongly than they actually do, 
and they predict that the feeling will last longer than it actually does.  
Accordingly, a growing number of studies have shown that, in the case 
of physical disabilities, healthy people regularly predict that disabled 
people will experience greater unhappiness for a longer period of time 
than they actually do.
91
   
                                                          
86
 Daniel Kahneman & Richard Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced 
Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 230 (2006).  
87
 See Lucas, supra note 77, at 718.   
88
 Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting:  Knowing 
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005) (hereinafter 
AF). 
89
 For an excellent recent review, see Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, 
Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 SCIENCE 1351 (2007). 
90
 Wilson & Gilbert, AF, supra note 88. 
91
 See Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be 
Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 112 (2005) (hereinafter D&S); D.L. 
Sackett & G.W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as Perceived by the 
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 The most compelling explanation for the mispredictions 
associated with affective forecasting suggests that people suffer from a 
focusing illusion
92
 (also called focalism
93
) that causes them to pay too 
much attention to the narrow aspects of life that will be affected by a 
change while ignoring the much broader ways in which life will 
remain the same.
94
  As Wilson et al. note, ―People think about the 
focal event in a vacuum without reminding themselves that their lives 
will not occur in a vacuum but will be filled with many other 
events.‖95  For example, when people are asked to think about the 
effect paraplegia would have on their lives, they tend to focus on the 
limitations it will create rather than their unaltered ability to enjoy a 
glass of wine or a conversation with friends.
96
  By directing their 
attention to the changes wrought by disability, healthy people 
underestimate how happy they will remain.  This accounts for a 
substantial amount of their mispredictions about affective intensity. 
 Faulty predictions about the duration of feelings associated 
with negative events are often caused by a failure to anticipate how 
rapidly the psychological immune system enables people to adapt to 
unpleasant emotions.  Gilbert et al. refer to this failure to predict 
                                                                                                                                         
General Public, 32 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697 (1978); Peter A. Ubel et al., 
Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision 
Making, 24 (No. 4 Suppl.) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (2005); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do 
Nonpatients Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health 
Conditions Because of a Focusing Illusion, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190 (2007); 
Boyd et al., supra note 69. 
92
 David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make 
People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 340 (1998).  Ubel et al. define a focusing illusion as ―a failure to appreciate that 
not all life domains or events will be equally affected by a given change in 
circumstances.‖  Ubel et al., D&S, supra note 91, at 112. 
93
 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism:  A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821 (2000). 
94
 Gilbert and Wilson discuss four reasons why affective forecasting errors 
occur—mental simulations of future events tend to be unrepresentative, 
essentialized, abbreviated, and decontextualized.  Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 89, 
at __.  Summarizing the research, they write, ―[The mind‘s] simulations are deficient 
because they are based on a small number of memories, they omit large numbers of 
features, they do not sustain themselves over time, and they lack context.  Compared 
to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are mere cardboard cut-outs of reality.‖  
Id. 
95
 Wilson et al, supra note 93, at 822. 
96
 Ubel et al., D&S, supra note 91, at 113. 
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adaptation as immune neglect.
97
  When asked to predict how long they 
are likely to feel bad following a negative event, subjects ignore the 
―set of dynamic psychological processes . . . that produce a change in 
the relationship between what happens and how one feels.‖98  In a 
separate paper, they note that the underestimation of hedonic 
adaptation ―is probably the most commonly observed error in research 
on hedonic prediction.‖99  When making predictions about future 
changes, people tend to focus principally on the early stages of those 
changes, when hedonic reactions are most intense.  Adaptation, as 
noted above, takes time, but the mental simulations people use to 
predict later emotional states are tightly condensed.  Ex ante 
predictions thus tend to overvalue the intensely emotional change and 
undervalue the long period of recovery and adaptation.
100
 
 Perhaps the most significant research on focusing illusions and 
immune neglect is the  increasing body of evidence indicating that 
healthy people fail to predict the limited impact of disabilities on their 
quality of life (QoL).
101
  One early study showed that, on a scale of 0 
(conditions as bad as death) to 1 (perfect health), the general public 
estimates that the quality of life for patients receiving dialysis is 0.39, 
while dialysis patients report their QoL as 0.56.
102
  Similarly, patients 
with colostomies rate their quality of life at 0.92, while patients 
without colostomies predict that QoL with a colostomy would be 
                                                          
97
 Ubel et al. describe a similar phenomenon that they call failure to consider 
adaptation.  They describe this failure as a distinct type of focusing illusion, noting, 
―People who have read a description of paraplegia should recognize that paraplegia 
does not affect the person‘s ability to enjoy a good TV show.  However, they may 
fail to consider that the grief they will feel upon finding out that they have paraplegia 
will subside over time and that the sense of loss that they feel because they have to 
abandon favorite pastimes will be replaced by the joy they derive from other 
pastimes.‖  Id.  
98
 Id. 
99
 Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 89, at 1353. 
100
 Id. 
101
 As noted, the research compares the predictions of healthy people to the 
actual ratings of disabled people.  This research does not exactly match the situation 
that we are concerned with in settlement negotiations, where the person making the 
prediction is actually a recently injured victim.  There is every reason to believe, 
however, that the same biases affecting healthy people will also affect the recently 
injured.  The latter are just as likely (if not more likely) to suffer from abbreviated, 
decontextualized, and essentialized simulations of future states because they will be 
currently experiencing the intense hedonic effects that tend to improperly color 
predictions. 
102
 Sackett & Torrance, supra note 91. 
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0.80.
103
  And Schkade and Kahneman have found that people who 
have known a paraplegic estimate that paraplegics spend considerably 
more time in a good mood, while people who have not known a 
paraplegic estimate that paraplegics spend more time in a bad mood.
104
  
As the authors explain, ―The less you know about paraplegics, the 
worse off you think they are.‖105  Part of the problem, they suggest, is 
that when people are asked to make these predictions, they evaluate 
the various outcomes as changes rather than states.  Schkade and 
Kahneman write, ―Common sense suggests that recent lottery winners 
or the newly paraplegic will spend more of their time responding to 
their special circumstances in the first few weeks than they will later.  
Thus, if people judge what it is like to be a paraplegic by imagining 
what it is like to become a paraplegic, they will exaggerate the long-
term impact of this tragic event on life satisfaction.‖106  As we will 
later argue, this focus on becoming rather than being may account for 
certain aspects of victims‘ settlement behavior.  When estimating the 
sum that they feel will adequately compensate them for their injuries, 
it is likely that recently injured plaintiffs will make the same kinds of 
forecasting errors that healthy people make because their attention will 
be directed towards the major changes brought about by disability.  
Thus, they will likely overestimate the long-term hedonic impact of 
their injuries. 
 
 C.  Hedonic Adaptation and the Law 
 
 The practical implications of this wave of hedonic psychology 
research have not escaped the notice of legal scholars.  Much of the 
research is specifically targeted toward policy-makers in the health 
professions where new ideas about adaptation and focalism are likely 
to challenge received wisdom about informed consent and end-of-life 
decisions.
107
  That this research will also have profound consequences 
                                                          
103
 Boyd et al., supra note 69, at 60. 
104
 Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 92. 
105
 Id. at 340. 
106
 Id. at 345. 
107
 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do 
People Know What They Will Like?, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 187, 198 
(1992).  The authors note, ―[T]he value that is attached to ‗informed consent‘ to 
surgery is surely limited if patients are incapable of assessing the quality of their 
post-surgical lives.‖  Id.; see also Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable, supra 
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for the law is becoming increasingly clear.  Jeremy Blumenthal, for 
example, has published an extensive evaluation of the implications of 
affective forecasting failures for legal analysis.
108
  His work examines 
subjects ranging from civil damages and capital punishment to 
euthanasia and informed consent.  Other scholars have focused 
primarily on hedonic adaptation and tort law, and it will be useful to 
describe some of their work in order to place our conclusions in 
context.
109
 
 Oswald and Powdthavee, the economists who produced the 
longitudinal study of British survey data discussed above, framed their 
research in terms of its value for judges and juries awarding damages 
in torts cases.  The authors note the lack of rigor associated with the 
assignment of pain and suffering awards based on ―conceptual 
foundations that are, at best, ad hoc.‖110  Such damage awards are 
                                                                                                                                         
note 91; Ubel et al., Do Non-Patients Underestimate, supra note 91; Boyd et al., 
supra note 69. 
108
 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective 
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005).  Blumenthal discusses the implications of 
affective forecasting research for a range legal issues including civil damage awards, 
victim impact statements, the ―death row phenomenon,‖ sexual harassment, 
surrogate mothering, euthanasia, advance directives, informed consent, and litigants‘ 
emotional expectations.  In this last section, Blumenthal touches on the impact 
litigants‘ mispredictions of future emotional states may have on litigation behavior, 
id. at 204-208, but he does not apply these findings to settlement behavior in the 
ways suggested by our work.  See also Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance 
Cases Bargain After Judgment?  A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
373 (1999); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 
INT‘L. REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992); Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 
86 CORNELL. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
109
 Blumenthal cites much of the relevant law-related scholarship available.  
More recent research includes papers presented at the University of Chicago School 
of Law‘s 2007 conference on the Legal Implications of the New Happiness 
Research, including Jonathan Haidt, Hive Psychology, Group Selection and 
Happiness; Christopher Hsee, Money, Consumption and Happiness; Paul Dolan, 
Measuring Well-Being for Public Policy: Preferences or Experiences; Matthew 
Adler & Eric Posner, Money, Happiness and Well-Being: Does Happiness Research 
Undermine Cost-Benefit Analysis?; Martha Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? 
Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology; David Weisbach, What Does Happiness 
Research Tell Us about Tax Policy?; Justin Wolfers & Betsey Stevenson, Happiness 
and Family Policy; Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death and the 
Calculation of Hedonic Damages; Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and 
Suffering: It’s Not (Just) about Pain and Suffering.  All papers are available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/events/happy.html. 
110
 Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 72, at 14. 
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unlikely to account for the substantial hedonic adaptation that occurs 
following an injury, and the authors propose to calculate an 
appropriate schedule of payments that would compensate the victim 
for changing levels of decreased quality of life.  With sufficiently 
accurate data regarding the increase in QoL associated with income 
gains, they hope to be able to estimate the amount of money that 
corresponds to the diminution in QoL in the years following an 
accident.
111
   
 In a recent paper, Cass Sunstein also describes problems in the 
way compensation for injuries is meted out by the legal system.  He 
notes that awards of hedonic damages are ―notoriously variable,‖ and 
that they often appear irrational and incoherent.
112
  The literature on 
hedonic adaptation, however, suggests an explanation for such awards.  
Just as healthy people suffer from focusing illusions and immune 
neglect that cause them to underestimate the extent to which disabled 
people adapt to injuries, jurors are likely to ignore or misunderstand 
adaptation to injuries when deciding on awards of hedonic damages.  
The trial is basically a factory for the production of focusing illusions:  
―The basic problem is that when asked to award damages for a certain 
loss, the attention of the jury (and the judge) is fixated on the loss in 
question. . . .  Deliberately focused on a particular injury, juries are 
unlikely to see that most of the time, the plaintiff may not be much 
focused on the particular injury.  The very circumstances of trial create 
the focusing illusion.‖113  This focusing illusion—and the jury‘s failure 
to consider the plaintiff‘s likely adaptation—will often result in 
overcompensation for injuries with little lasting hedonic effect, the 
―illusory losses‖ of Sunstein‘s title.114  Yet just as the social scientific 
literature indicates why some plaintiffs are overcompensated, Sunstein 
sees that it also suggests why other plaintiffs are likely to be 
undercompensated.  As noted above, some injuries, such as persistent 
low-level pain, actually have long-lasting hedonic effects; they are, in 
a sense, unadaptable.  Juries are unlikely to recognize such 
                                                          
111
 Id. at 15.  In an earlier draft of the paper, the authors attempted to calculate 
specific sums that would be required to compensate victims for lost quality of life.  
In the most recent draft, they have removed specific figures and are content with 
suggesting the possibility of calculating approximate damage awards. 
112
 Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 3 (2007) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=983810. 
113
 Id., at 11.   
114
 Blumenthal makes a similar point in his article.  See Blumenthal, supra note 
108, at 184. 
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distinctions, and the seemingly insignificant nature of the injury will 
often occasion a small hedonic damage award.   
 In a recent article on hedonic damages and disability, Samuel 
Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger also draw attention to the likelihood 
of jurors misunderstanding the nature of hedonic adaptation.  When 
awarding compensation for hedonic damages, jurors tend to focus 
inordinately on the limiting effects of disability and, as ostensibly 
healthy people, fail to recognize how well most disabled people adapt.  
Drawing on disability rights literature, Bagenstos and Schlanger 
suggest that in having healthy jurors pass judgment on the quality of 
life of disabled people, the legal system devalues the experiences of 
people with disabilities and encourages the perception of disability as 
a tragedy in need of pity and governmental support.
115
    Moreover, the 
trial process, by making the plaintiff perform her disability in front of 
the jury, itself becomes debilitating.  The authors suggest that ―by 
focusing on the negative feelings that occur during [the initial 
adjustment period], plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their 
ultimate ability to adapt to their new condition.‖116  Accordingly, they 
reach the conclusion that courts should not award hedonic damages for 
lost quality of life arising from disability.
117
 
 As described above, the evidence for hedonic adaptation is 
more complex than Bagenstos and Schlanger suggest.  Recall that 
while some disabilities seem to be highly adaptable, others, such as 
those resulting in continuous or worsening pain, tend to be 
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 Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, ___ (2008).  They write: 
When courts uphold hedonic damages awards based on the view that 
disabling injuries limit life‘s enjoyment and keep plaintiffs from being a 
‗whole person,‘ they entrench the societal view that disability is inherently 
tragic, and encourage people with disabilities to see their lives as tragedies.  
The view of disability as tragedy, for which the proper response is pity, 
charity, or compensation, has been one of the major targets of disability 
rights activists (and we endorse their campaign). 
Id. at 130. 
116
 Id. at 141. 
117
 Id. at 130.  They write: 
For deterrence and compensation reasons, people who experience disabling 
injuries should be able to recover for their physical pain; for medical 
expenses and the cost of assistive technology and personal assistance; and 
for the varied and costly accommodations that can enable them to 
participate in our collective social life.  But they should not recover for any 
purported effect of disability on the enjoyment of life. 
Id. at 106. 
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unadaptable.  The psychological literature indicates that responses to 
disability may be conditioned by a number of factors, including the 
nature of the disability.
118
  Moreover, even when adaptation does 
occur, in most cases it is incomplete.  People do not tend to recover 
fully; there is often some lasting, if surprisingly small, hedonic 
effect.
119
  Although hedonic adaptation may be variable and 
incomplete, its implications for the law are no less significant.  Our 
account of these implications turns, for the first time, to the role 
adaptation and focalism may play in the settlement of legal disputes.   
 
 
III. HEDONIC ADAPTATION AND IMPROVED SETTLEMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 Consider the class of injuries that involve ongoing disabilities 
or losses of function, but not continuous pain—in other words, those 
to which humans are capable of adapting hedonically.
120
  Where these 
types of injuries give rise to lawsuits for personal injury, hedonic 
adaptation will likely instigate a greater number of settlements than 
standard models would predict.  Hedonic adaptation‘s effect on the 
settlement process is twofold.  First, by the time a trial is set to occur, 
many personal injury plaintiffs will have adjusted to their injuries and 
concomitantly reduced their settlement demands.  Second, plaintiffs 
will understand—consciously or unconsciously—that settlement (or 
―closure‖ by some other means) is essential to the process of hedonic 
adaptation and opt to end litigation more expeditiously as a result. 
 
 A.  Adaptation as Inducement to Settle 
 
 The long delays associated with the civil litigation process are 
commonly thought of as a source of costs to the system, costs that 
                                                          
118
 See Marcel Dijkers, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Meta 
Analysis of the Effects of Disablement Components, 35 SPINAL CORD 829 (1997).  
Dijkers points to the effects of occupation, family life, mobility, and social 
integration play in individual responses to disability.  Id. at 836-37. 
119
 See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 72; Lucas, supra note 77. 
120
 Injuries or conditions that fall into this category include loss of limb, partial 
paralysis, loss of sexual function, blindness or deafness, and a variety of other 
disabilities that will eventually heal to the point that the subject is no longer in pain, 
but not to the point that the subject regains the lost functionality.  For a more 
complete description, see Part II, supra. 
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should be avoided whenever possible.  On their own, of course, 
drawn-out litigation procedures raise the costs of litigating to both 
sides (and to the public at large), as all parties are forced to devote 
more time and resources to the litigation.  Lengthy litigation periods 
also delay the arrival of redress to the tort victim.
121
  In so doing, they 
may make potential plaintiffs less likely to litigate in the first instance, 
or less likely to follow through with already commenced litigation, as 
the means of support that might allow the victim to pursue litigation 
disappear.
122
  For these reasons, the most prominent attempts at civil 
litigation reform have focused on alternative methods of dispute 
resolution—in particular, arbitration123—that are designed to curb 
costs primarily by increasing the speed at which cases are handled and 
decided and eliminating many of the procedures that typically serve to 
retard the rapid progression of litigation matters. 
 At the same time, these procedural delays are likely to have 
salutary effects on the litigation system as well.  The explanation rests 
with the psychological healing that the injury victim will undergo 
during the period before trial.  During the first few months that follow 
a severe injury—a period of time that includes the filing of litigation 
and the initial pre-trial procedures—the plaintiff is likely to suffer 
from a focusing illusion.  With his attention focused on his injury, the 
plaintiff will overestimate its impact on his future happiness: he will 
anticipate that the injury will prevent him from achieving the same 
enjoyment of life that he experienced before being hurt.
124
 
However, during the nearly two years that it takes a typical 
civil case to reach trial, the plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to 
his injury—even if that injury is permanent—and will report levels of 
happiness very close to his pre-injury levels.
125
  Two years after a 
plaintiff has suffered an injury, the plaintiff will likely view that injury 
as far less severe, far less debilitating, and generally far less important 
than he did in the months following the accident.
126
  This adaptation 
will have two relevant effects.  First, the degree to which a plaintiff 
believes he has been ―wronged‖ will dissipate.  His sense of the scale 
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 See Part I, supra. 
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 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
123
 See Federal Arbitration Act, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2007); See Part 
I, supra. 
124
 See Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 92; Ubel et al., D&S, supra note 91, at 
112; Wilson et al., supra note 93, at 822. 
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 See generally Part II, supra. 
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 See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 72, at 15. 
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of the indignity that has been perpetrated against him will diminish.  
Second, the amount of money that the plaintiff believes will fairly 
compensate him for his injury—will ―make him whole,‖ in the typical 
parlance of tort damages—will decrease.  Immediately after a serious 
injury, a plaintiff is likely to feel that only a sizeable amount of money 
will adequately compensate him for the loss of function that he has 
suffered; two years later, when the plaintiff has had the opportunity to 
hedonically adapt and the injury seems less debilitating, what the 
plaintiff perceives as appropriate compensation will decline as well.
127
 
 In combination, these two effects will drive down a tort 
plaintiff‘s settlement price.  Consider, for instance, a plaintiff who 
loses a limb in a traffic accident (through no fault of his own).  
Imagine that in the months that follow the injury, when the lawsuit is 
initially filed, the plaintiff views his injury as highly incapacitating 
and believes (a rough estimate, of course) that he will need $280,000 
to make him whole.
128
  Over the course of the two years between filing 
and trial, the plaintiff adapts to his injury and comes to believe that 
only $140,000 is necessary to fairly compensate him for the harm he 
                                                          
127
 See Part I.C., supra.  We certainly do not mean to suggest that all types of 
tort damages are susceptible to adaptation.  Tort damages typically comprise a 
variety of linked payments designed to compensate the plaintiff for various aspects 
of his injury.  Plaintiffs can recover damages for medical expenses and economic 
costs (typically lost wages due to disability) incurred as a result of the injury.  These 
expenses are not ―adaptable‖ in the sense we describe here; a plaintiff‘s view of 
these costs is unlikely to change.  But plaintiffs may also recover damages for 
present and future pain and suffering, and in many jurisdictions they are permitted to 
recoup so-called ―hedonic‖ damages to compensate for lost enjoyment of their lives.  
See generally, Sunstein, supra note 112, at 3-4 & nn. 4-11; Edward P. Berla et al., 
Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J. FORENSIC 
ECONOMICS (1990).  For specific examples of hedonic damage awards, see, e.g., 
Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (loss of ability 
to ride horses); Day v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So.2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct. 
App. 2002) (loss of ability to play high school sports).  Plaintiffs will adjust to the 
losses for which these latter types of damages are meant to compensate.  Pain and 
suffering awards constitute approximately fifty percent of the total value of monetary 
damages in personal injury cases, see Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical 
Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
265, 296 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: 
Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 
(1988), and so adaptation that reduces pain-and-suffering damages could have a 
substantial effect on the overall valuation of a personal injury case. 
128
 These numbers have obviously been chosen to correspond to the hypothetical 
presented in Part I.C., supra. 
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has suffered.
129
  Irrespective of the fact that the expected jury award 
will not have changed, the plaintiff will likely see a lower settlement 
amount as appropriate given the apparent amelioration of his injury.
130
  
As the plaintiff‘s settlement price declines, the chances of settlement 
increase
131—perhaps even substantially, commensurate with the 
significant degree of hedonic adaptation that humans typically 
experience.
132
  Civil settlements are valuable cost-saving 
mechanisms,
133
 and many of the principal rules of civil litigation are 
designed with the goal of encouraging settlement in mind.
134
  Hedonic 
adaptation operates as a significant background complement to these 
rules.
135
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 This is a reasonable approximation of a typical plaintiff‘s ability to adapt.  As 
we noted previously, moderately disabled plaintiffs recover 50% of their ―lost 
happiness‖ through adaptation over a period of two years.  See Oswald & 
Powdthavee, supra note 72, at 15; supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
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 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 30, at 130-33. 
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 See id.; Part I.C, supra. 
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 Supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
133
 E.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement 
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1574 (2006); Bement v. 
Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 93 (1902) (expressing the view that settlement is ―a 
legitimate and desirable result in itself‖).  But see Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93  
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
134
 See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 33 (―The court may direct the attorneys—and, 
when appropriate, the parties—to participate in one or more conferences to address 
any matter that may aid in disposing of the proceedings, including simplifying the 
issues and discussing settlement.‖); In re Young, 253 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(Posner, J.) (noting that settlements may typically be kept confidential); Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of California, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Local Rules, available at 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/LocalRul.nsf/fec20e529a5572f0882569b600660
7e0/8ff98f4dddff8f7f882568cf00561683/$FILE/ADR12-05.pdf (extensive local 
rules intended to facilitate settlement). 
135
 The model of civil litigation we employ is, of course, overly simplified in 
one important respect.  It does not take into account the potential for attorney-client 
agency costs to interfere with the smooth translation of client preferences into 
litigation decisions.  See infra note 161.  However, to the extent that they affect the 
behavior of actors within our model, agency costs are in fact likely to augment—
rather than diminish—the effects of adaptation that we describe.  Ninety-five percent 
of personal injury plaintiffs are represented by attorneys working on a contingent-fee 
basis.  Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions 
or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 626 n.3 (1995).  
Contingent-fee attorneys will tend to prefer early settlement over protracted 
litigation because they bear all of the costs and risk of protracted court battles.  John 
Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 
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 This is not to say, of course, that drawn-out litigation 
procedures are effective at driving parties toward settlement only 
insofar as they permit the psychological immune system to operate.  
Discovery allows parties to eliminate the uncertainties that surround 
each side‘s analysis of the case and thereby narrow the gap between 
their respective valuations. 
 Nor do we mean to claim that hedonic adaptation—and the 
increased prospects for settlement that it carries—necessarily justifies 
each and every procedural piece of the civil litigation puzzle from a 
cost-benefit perspective.  The marginal adaptation generated by a 
particular procedural rule may be very slight, despite the fact that it 
imposes severe costs upon the parties (and offers little else of value).  
Rather, we mean only to argue that the current cost-benefit accounting 
of the civil trial process is incorrect, and biased toward over-
estimation of litigation costs.
136
  By drawing upon and facilitating 
hedonic adaptation, the civil trial process manages to recoup for 
litigants some of the costs that the extensive pre-litigation procedures 
would appear to impose upon them. 
 
 B.  Settlement as Adaptive Mechanism 
 
The concept of ―closure‖ as an end goal for crime and tort 
victims has gained tremendous currency in recent years.  According to 
conventional psychological wisdom, a victim gains something of value 
from achieving a sense of finality regarding the crime or tort 
committed against him.
137
  Within the criminal law, courts and 
legislatures have attempted to facilitate the search for closure both by 
affording victims the opportunity to participate more directly in the 
final stages of a trial
138
 or by foreshortening the process of trial and 
                                                                                                                                         
911–12 ("The lawyer could settle many cases in the time it takes to litigate one, so it 
is rational for her to settle quickly even if doing so reduces her profit in the 
individual case."); Charles Silver, Class Actions—Representative Proceedings, in 5 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 194, 213 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest 
eds., 2000).  Thus, it is the rare contingent-fee attorney who will stand in the way of 
an adapted plaintiff‘s desire to settle. 
136
 See Part I, supra.  
137
 See generally Susan Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of 
Emotion (unpublished manuscript; draft on file with author). 
138
 Douglas E. Beloof et al, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as 
Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003); Elizabeth Beck et al, Seeking 
Sanctuary: Interviews with Family Members of Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 382, 387-90 (2003) (describing the victims‘ rights movement).  The Supreme 
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appeal in the interests of bringing proceedings to a close more 
expeditiously.
139
  This emphasis on closure does not fall neatly into 
classical economic models or categories of preferences.  Under 
standard economic assumptions, the most that might be said is that 
individuals derive utility by achieving finality—by being able to put 
one matter aside as successfully completed in order to focus on others.  
Here, ―closure‖ is an end in itself, and one of dubious pedigree at that. 
Studies of hedonic adaptation provide an alternative, deeper 
explanation.  For a tort plaintiff, ―closure‖ means the definitive end to 
legal proceedings and the end of one setting in which the plaintiff 
might be reminded of his condition.  On this account, realizing closure 
from a lawsuit is a means of facilitating the process of hedonic 
adaptation.  Humans are thus conditioned to seek closure and 
finality—particularly with respect to painful episodes in the past—in 
order to abet their psychological immune systems.  The more quickly 
and completely a plaintiff can put matters concerning an accident 
behind him and ―move on,‖ the sooner his psychological immune 
system can bury thoughts of his injury and adapt the plaintiff 
hedonically to his new circumstances.  Relatedly, a number of studies 
                                                                                                                                         
Court has appeared to endorse the search for closure as one of the principal 
rationales supporting the constitutionality of victim impact statements.  See Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―Murder is the ultimate 
act of depersonalization.  It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears 
into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person. 
The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that 
back.‖); Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 550 (2003) (referring to Justice O‘Connor‘s concurrence 
and explaining that ―the argument is styled in terms of returning something to the 
murder victims themselves, but obviously that action is symbolic.  Its impact is for 
the benefit of the victims‘ families and friends . . . .‖). 
139
 See e.g. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
government‘s interests in precluding post-conviction access to evidence included 
―guarding against a flood of requests, protecting the finality of convictions, and 
ensuring closure for victims and survivors‖) (emphasis added); Skaggs v. 
Commonwealth, 2005 WL 2314073, at 5 (2005) (―Surely the family and friends of 
the two victims are entitled to some consideration as to the closure of these grisly 
and senseless murders—24 years have passed.  The legal process afforded the 
convicted killer has been much more than due.‖); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130 
(Idaho 2005) (―With the enactment of I.C. § 19-5304(2), there is a strong public 
policy ground for not abating a criminal conviction.  If the conviction is abated, it 
may abate the restitution order because, under the statute, a conviction or finding of 
guilt is necessary for an order of restitution.  Further, abatement of the conviction 
would deny the victim of the fairness, respect and dignity guaranteed by these laws 
by preventing the finality and closure they are designed to provide.‖). 
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have demonstrated a strong correlation between an injury victim‘s 
level of control or agency over his life and his success at hedonic 
adaptation.
140
  A plaintiff‘s ability to settle his own personal injury 
lawsuit may itself contribute to his psychological recovery. 
Humans may understand these processes at a conscious level—
the search for closure may be deliberate and knowing—or only at an 
unconscious one—and thus seek closure for reasons not entirely 
known or understood.  On either account, people will act to their own 
hedonic advantage by seeking closure on matters that have the 
potential to reinvigorate painful memories. 
Plaintiffs are thus likely to view settlement as the most ready 
means by which to gain closure and smooth the progress of 
psychological repair.  Though discussion of settlement may itself 
invoke painful memories,
141
 plaintiffs will understand that their long-
term happiness rests on their capacity to end a lawsuit that would 
otherwise retard hedonic adaptation.  Accordingly, when evaluating a 
lawsuit‘s prospects of settlement, the possibility of achieving closure 
is not merely an independent, unquantifiable variable in the plaintiff‘s 
welfare function.
142
  In the context of many types of personal injury 
lawsuits, closure is shorthand for the hedonic advantage that a plaintiff 
can realize from settling the case before trial.  In cases involving 
injuries that permit significant hedonic adaptation,
143
 plaintiffs will 
seek out settlement for exactly that reason.
144
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 See Part IV.C., infra. 
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144
 Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that empirical studies regarding 
participation by victims and their families in the sentencing phase of criminal 
trials—participation that is driven by a desire to achieve closure—reveal mixed or 
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IV. EXTENSIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
 
 The foregoing Parts set forth our case for adaptation‘s power as 
an inducement to settlement.  In the sections that follow, we outline a 
number of ways in which we might test these theories empirically, and 
we confront several of the most significant potential objections to our 
behavioral framework. 
 
 A.  Testable Predictions 
  
 One of the strengths of our approach is that it generates 
testable hypotheses regarding settlement rates for particular types of 
civil cases.  Consider two hypothetical personal injury lawsuits, one in 
which the plaintiff has lost some mobility in an auto accident, and one 
in which the plaintiff—as the result of a workplace injury—now 
suffers from recurring migraine headaches.
145
  These two cases, if 
brought in the same jurisdiction, will involve symmetric pre-trial 
procedures: discovery, mediation, motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment, and so forth.  A priori, there is every reason to expect that 
any divergences between the plaintiff and defendant in each case—
informational asymmetries, discrepancies in litigation valuation, etc.—
will themselves be symmetric across cases.  Imagine further that the 
two cases have approximately equivalent expected values when 
litigated before a jury.  Based on these considerations alone, the auto 
accident plaintiff and the workplace accident plaintiff should be 
equally likely to settle before trial. 
 The lone difference between these cases, as conceived here, is 
that the auto injury plaintiff will likely be able to adapt to his loss of 
function while the workplace injury plaintiff will not.  The loss of 
mobility is a paradigm case for the power of hedonic adaptation; 
studies have shown that even people who lose the power to walk 
return to nearly pre-injury levels of happiness.
146
  By contrast, 
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recurrent conditions such as headaches and ringing in the ears present 
(as described above) among the worst cases for adaptation.
147
  By the 
time that the several years of pre-trial machinations have run their 
course, the workplace injury plaintiff is likely to perceive himself as 
still suffering in a way that the auto accident plaintiff genuinely does 
not.  The auto injury plaintiff will be willing to settle for a range of 
values that the workplace injury plaintiff would still consider 
inadequate.  Our theory thus generates three predictions: 
 
1.  During the time between filing and trial, settlement demands from 
plaintiffs with adaptable injuries will decrease in value by greater 
margins than settlement demands from plaintiffs with non-adaptable 
injuries. 
 
2.  Consequently, personal injury cases involving adaptable injuries 
will settle at higher rates than personal injury cases involving non-
adaptable injuries, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.  Independent of the effects of costs and informational advantages, 
hedonic adaptation will cause settlement rates for adaptable personal 
injury to increase as the time between filing and trial increases. 
 
This last hypothesis warrants further explanation.  Lengthy 
pre-trial procedures have the capacity to induce settlement in two ways 
that are orthogonal to our analysis here.  First, they may increase the 
costs of proceeding along the path to trial, thus rendering pre-trial 
settlement more attractive.  Second, they frequently (though not 
always) serve to provide the parties with greater information regarding 
the respective strengths of their cases, information that narrows the 
gap between the parties‘ subjective valuations and facilitates accord.148  
Consider, then, a set of accelerated pre-trial procedures that provide 
the same informational gains to the parties as standard litigation 
practices and generate the same level of costs.  A simply accelerated 
litigation calendar—for instance, the Eastern District of Virginia‘s 
famous ―rocket docket‖149—would possess this feature.  We predict 
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that cases litigated on such an accelerated schedule will settle at a 
lower rate than cases litigated at a more deliberate speed. 
 Empirical tests of these hypotheses are beyond the scope of 
this article.  Nonetheless, the necessary data, particularly concerning 
hypotheses #2 and #3, should be relatively easy to obtain.  Empirical 
analysis of the hedonic adaptation has matured into a vigorous 
science;
150
 we hope that empirical research into adaptation‘s effects on 
the trial process will soon follow suit. 
 
 B.  Principal Objections 
 
1. Focalism in Settlement Negotiations 
 
 While the evidence supporting theories of hedonic adaptation 
has by this point become quite robust,
151
 psychologists and economists 
remain divided and uncertain as to the methods and mechanisms by 
which it operates.  Candidate theories focus on changes in the victim‘s 
aspirations,
152
 memories,
153
 and interpretations of the negative event‘s 
meaning.
154
 Nonetheless, the leading hypothesis is the notion that 
humans are simply capable of blocking out or ignoring losses and 
limitations, even when they affect matters of daily life.
155
  For 
instance, an individual who becomes paralyzed below the waist and 
relegated to a wheelchair may occasionally be reminded of the fact 
that she is in a wheelchair and is therefore incapable of many typical 
activities.  But for the most part her injury is low-wattage background 
noise; she neither thinks about it nor perceives the ways in which it 
limits her.  As Daniel Kahneman, the pioneer of this theory, has 
explained in particularly pithy form: ――Nothing in life matters quite as 
much as you think it does while you are thinking about it.‖156
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 This ―focalism‖157 raises the possibility that settlement 
negotiations, which we posit here as a beneficial side effect of hedonic 
adaptation, may be self-defeating.  The very fact of negotiating a 
settlement to the plaintiff‘s lawsuit might remind the plaintiff of the 
severity (or existence) of his condition, subvert the process of hedonic 
adjustment, and return the plaintiff, at least momentarily, to his 
diminished post-injury state of happiness.  Settlement-induced 
―hedonic relapse‖ could re-inflate the plaintiff‘s perception of the 
severity of his injury and its worth. 
 Though this counter-productive effect may occur in many 
settings, we do not believe it poses a serious threat to the settlement-
forcing adaptation that we‘ve detailed here.  Typical settlement 
negotiations do not involve the type of discussions that are most likely 
to trigger hedonic relapse.  Late-period settlement negotiations are 
most likely to revolve around dollar figures, and nothing more. 
At the inception of litigation, before the parties have conducted 
discovery and fully defined the scope of claims, any negotiations 
between the plaintiff and defendant—indeed, any conversations 
between the plaintiff and his attorney—are likely to revolve around the 
scope of the plaintiff‘s injury.  The plaintiff‘s (or defendant‘s) attorney 
may intend for the plaintiff to visit an additional set of doctors; the 
parties may be uncertain as to the extent of the plaintiff‘s injury; and 
the plaintiff himself may not know or understand the long-term 
lifestyle effects of his condition.  These types of interactions cannot 
help but retard the process of hedonic adaptation. 
As other scholars have noted, the trial itself is also likely to 
create negative focalism effects.
158
  The plaintiff will be seated in 
court every day as the parties rehash the plaintiff‘s injury and debate 
the continuing effects of that injury upon the plaintiff‘s life.  The 
plaintiff will hear expert testimony from both sides regarding his 
health and disability.  And he will likely be called upon to testify about 
his accident and his continuing health.  Even if the plaintiff has 
succeeded in adapting hedonically by the time that his case reaches 
trial, the trial itself is likely to undo those gains. 
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Yet between the initial stages of the litigation and the trial, the 
plaintiff‘s health holds very little day-to-day importance.  Once the 
plaintiff‘s condition has become a known quantity, there is no further 
need for the sides to discuss it.
159
  It is during this period that the 
plaintiff‘s adaptive response begins to operate, as the injury and the 
medically intensive inception of litigation both begin to fade into the 
background. 
If the case does not settle shortly after it is filed, this fallow 
period may be punctuated by settlement offers and negotiations by 
both sides.  These interactions, however, bear little resemblance in 
form or substance to the type of emotional presentations that 
characterize a personal injury trial.  By this point, settlement offers are 
likely to take the form of suggested dollar figures, and little else.  By 
the time that the parties reach the negotiating table, the attorneys will 
have latched onto approximate case valuations and acceptable 
settlement ranges, and reaching agreement on a particular number will 
be the sole priority. 
Importantly, plaintiffs are most often bystanders to these 
negotiations.  Any conversation between the plaintiff and his attorney 
will almost certainly concern only whether the plaintiff wishes to 
accept a proffered settlement offer or hold out for more money.
160
  
Much has been made of the attorney-client relationship as a classic 
principal-agent problem.
161
  According to the standard model of 
attorney-client relations, the attorney manages the litigation and 
structures the investigation, analysis, and discussion of the relevant 
issues in order to impel the client towards her (the attorney‘s) 
preferred outcomes.  This litigation structure is commonly thought of 
as imposing costs upon plaintiffs—and upon third parties who may 
depend on litigation to provide remuneration and deterrence—through 
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the potential misalignment of incentives.
162
  Yet in personal injury 
cases, the attorney‘s function as an emotional screen may help 
facilitate hedonic adaptation and confer genuine benefits on litigants 
from both sides. 
 
2.  Civil Damages as Adaptive Mechanism? 
 
 Modern research on happiness and hedonic adaptation quite 
obviously poses a number of challenges to classical economic models.  
Standard rational-choice economics would predict that a loss of 
function or capability would have substantial long-term effects on a 
person‘s happiness.  Deprivation of the option value of a set of 
previously held capabilities—and thus of a variety of forms of activity 
and entertainment—would cause the disabled person to be less happy 
in the long run, assuming that perfect substitutes for those activities 
are unavailable.
163
  Moreover, standard economic models would 
predict that a person‘s happiness level should not change without a 
material change in that person‘s circumstances or an exogenously 
forced change in preferences.  The very existence of hedonic 
adaptation belies these predictions. 
 In response to the burgeoning literature on happiness, 
economists have proposed a number of explanations that would 
account for evidence of adaptation within the confines of classical 
rational-choice understandings of human behavior.  The most 
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plausible explanation posits that studies that purport to find hedonic 
adaptation are in fact succeeding only in capturing precisely the 
changes in circumstance that economists predict would raise happiness 
levels in the wake of serious injury or disability.
164
  In other words, 
tort victims are increasingly happy over time not because their 
psychological immune systems have successfully adapted them to 
their injuries, but because insurance payments, tort settlements, or 
even increased attention from family and friends have kicked in and 
restored them to their prior hedonic level.  Economists view this as an 
indication that insurance and tort settlements are achieving the proper 
effect, genuinely functioning as ―make whole‖ remedies for accident 
victims. 
Were this the case, it would pose a significant challenge to the 
theory we advance here.  If what appears to be ―hedonic adaptation‖ is 
only a product of the successful resolution of lawsuits and insurance 
claims, then our causal arrow points in precisely the wrong direction. 
Yet the data do not appear to support this view.  If cash 
payments via insurance or tort lawsuits were driving hedonic 
improvements, personal income should serve as the best indicator for 
when hedonic adaptation will occur, and when income is held constant 
researchers should find no evidence of adaptation.  However, studies 
of people with moderate and severe disabilities produce evidence of 
hedonic adaptation even after controlling for household income.
165
  
Likewise, if injury victims were adapting because of increased 
involvement by their family and friends, we would expect that 
differences in family structure or marital status would largely explain 
observed hedonic adaptation.  Again, this has not proven to be the 
case.  Family size and marital status—along with income—have 
statistically meaningful effects on the rate and extent of post-injury 
adaptation.
166
  But not only do those effects not account for the 
entirety of adaptation, they are dwarfed by the adaptation that appears 
to occur for reasons having nothing to do with family size or 
structure.
167
  The conclusion we draw from these studies is that while 
wealth and a supportive family may aid the process of hedonic 
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adaptation, the normal functioning of the psychological immune 
system alone will be enough to drive adaptation, and thus spur 
settlement. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In the wake of a devastating or crippling injury, it is only 
natural for most people to believe that their future lives will be 
significantly impacted, their future happiness severely diminished.  In 
keeping with these dire predictions, it is not surprising that victims 
who bring suit against their injurers will initially demand large 
compensating awards, certain that those payments will be necessary if 
they are to have any hope of returning to their pre-injury quality of 
life.  In reality, however, we now know that humans can adapt readily 
to even debilitating injuries.  A scant two years after losing a limb or 
the ability to walk, an accident victim often will have returned almost 
completely to the level of happiness he experienced prior to the injury.  
This human capacity for hedonic adaptation is likely to have profound 
consequences on the tort suits that personal injury victims bring 
against their tortfeasors.  The typical personal injury lawsuit drags on 
for almost two years from the date it is filed until the day that it 
reaches trial.  In the course of these two years, adaptation will drive 
down the settlement prices for many personal injury plaintiffs, 
enlarging the available window for negotiation between plaintiffs and 
defendants and increasing the rate of settlement.  The passage of some 
appreciable span of time is essential to the process; were civil 
litigation not prone to such stagnation, the psychological immune 
system would have no time within which to operate.  Procedural 
delays—long derided as unnecessary sources of costs and delay to 
litigants—thus function simultaneously as the means by which 
plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury cases are able to sidestep 
lengthy and expensive trials. 
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